This document describes the use of the ChaCha20 stream cipher along with the Poly1305 authenticator, combined into an AEAD algorithm for the Internet Key Exchange protocol (IKEv2) and for IPsec.
The Advanced Encryption Standard (AES - ) has become the gold standard in encryption. Its efficient design, wide implementation, and hardware support allow for high performance in many areas, including IPsec VPNs. On most modern platforms, AES is anywhere from 4x to 10x as fast as the previous most-used cipher, 3-key Data Encryption Standard (3DES -[SP800-67]). 3DES also has a 64-bit block, which means that the amount of data that can be encrypted before rekeying is required is not great. These reasons make AES not only the best choice, but the only choice.
The problem is that if future advances in cryptanalysis reveal a weakness in AES, VPN users will be in an unenviable position. With the only other widely supported cipher being the much slower 3DES, it is not feasible to re-configure IPsec installations away from AES.
[standby-cipher] describes this issue and the need for a standby cipher in greater detail.
This document proposes the fast and secure ChaCha20 stream cipher as such a standby cipher in an Authenticated Encryption with Associated Data (AEAD) construction with the Poly1305 authenticator for use with the Encapsulated Security Protocol (ESP - [RFC4303] ) and the Internet Key Exchange Protocol (IKEv2 - [RFC7296] ). The algorithms are described in a separate document ( [RFC7539] ). This document only describes the IPsec-specific things.
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Conventions Used in This Document
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119]. The ChaCha20 encryption algorithm requires the following parameters: a 256-bit key, a 96-bit nonce, and a 32-bit initial block counter. For ESP we set these as follows:
o The key is set as mentioned above. o The 96-bit nonce is formed from a concatenation of the 32-bit Salt and the 64-bit IV, as described above. o The Initial Block Counter is set to one (1). The reason that one is used for the initial counter rather than zero is that zero is reserved for generating the one-time Poly1305 key (see below)
As the ChaCha20 block function is not applied directly to the plaintext, no padding should be necessary. However, in keeping with the specification in RFC 4303, the plaintext always has a pad length octet and a Next Header octet and may require padding octets so as to align the buffer to an integral multiple of 4 octets. Finally, the Poly1305 function is run on the data to be authenticated, which is, as specified in section 2.8 of [RFC7539] a concatenation of the following in the below order:
o The Authenticated Additional Data (AAD) -see Section 2.1. o Zero-octet padding that rounds the length up to 16 octets. This is 4 or 8 octets depending on the length of the AAD. o The ciphertext o Zero octet padding that rounds the total length up to an integral multiple of 16 octets. o The length of the additional authenticated data (AAD) in octets (as a 64-bit integer encoded in little-endian byte order). o The length of the ciphertext in octets (as a 64-bit integer encoded in little-endian byte order).
The 128-bit output of Poly1305 is used as the tag. All 16 octets are included in the packet.
The encryption algorithm transform ID for negotiating this algorithm in IKE is ENCR_CHACHA20_POLY1305 (number is TBA by IANA).
The figure below is copied from RFC 4303: o The IV field is 64-bit. It is the final 64 bits of the 96-bit nonce. If the counter method is used for generating unique IVs, then the final 32 bits of the IV will be equal to the Sequence Number field. o The length of the Padding field need not exceed 4 octets.
However, neither RFC 4303 nor this specification require using the minimal padding length. o The Integrity Check Value field contains the 16 octet tag.
AAD Construction
The construction of the Additional Authenticated Data (AAD) is similar to the one in [RFC4106] . For security associations (SAs) with 32-bit sequence numbers the AAD is 8 octets: a 4-octet SPI followed by 4-octet sequence number ordered exactly as it is in the packet. For SAs with ESN the AAD is 12 octets: a 4-octet SPI followed by an 8-octet sequence number as a 64-bit integer in network byte order.
Use in IKEv2
AEAD algorithms can be used in IKE, as described in [RFC5282] . More specifically:
o The Encrypted Payload is as described in section 3 of that document. o The ChaCha20-Poly1305 keying material is derived similar to ESP: 36 octets are requested for each of SK_ei and SK_er, of which the first 32 form the key and the last 4 form the salt. No octets are requested for SK_ai and SK_ar. o The IV is 64 bits, as described in Section 2, and is included explicitly in the Encrypted payload. o The sender SHOULD include no padding and set the Pad Length field to zero. The receiver MUST accept any length of padding. o The AAD is as described in section 5.1 of RFC 5282, so it is 32 octets (28 for the IKEv2 header + 4 octets for the encrypted payload header) assuming no unencrypted payloads.
Negotiation in IKEv2
When negotiating the ChaCha20- 
Security Considerations
The ChaCha20 cipher is designed to provide 256-bit security.
The Poly1305 authenticator is designed to ensure that forged messages are rejected with a probability of 1-(n/(2^102)) for a 16n-octet message, even after sending 2^64 legitimate messages, so it is SUF-CMA in the terminology of [AE].
The most important security consideration in implementing this draft is the uniqueness of the nonce used in ChaCha20. The nonce should be selected uniquely for a particular key, but unpredictability of the nonce is not required. Counters and LFSRs are both acceptable ways of generating unique nonces.
Another issue with implementing these algorithms is avoiding side channels. This is trivial for ChaCha20, but requires some care for Poly1305. Considerations for implementations of these algorithms are in [RFC7539] .
The Salt value in used nonce construction in ESP and IKEv2 is derived from the keystream, same as the encryption key. It is never transmitted on the wire, but the security of the algorithm does not depend on its secrecy. Thus implementations that keep keys and other secret material within some security boundary MAY export the Salt from the security boundary. This may be useful if the API provided by the library accepts the nonce as parameter rather than the IV.
IANA Considerations
IANA is requested to assign one value from the IKEv2 "Transform Type 1 -Encryption Algorithm Transform IDs" registry, with name ENCR_CHACHA20_POLY1305, and this document as reference for both ESP and IKEv2.
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All of the algorithms in this document were designed by D. o The IV will also be the same as in the previous example. The fact that the IV and Salt are both the same means that the nonce is also the same. o Because the key and nonce are the same, so is the one-time
Poly1305 key. o The packet with be an Informational request carrying a single payload: A Notify payload with type SET_WINDOW_SIZE, setting the window size to 10. o iSPI = 0xc0 0xc1 0xc2 0xc3 0xc4 0xc5 0xc6 0xc7. o rSPI = 0xd0 0xd1 0xd2 0xd3 0xd4 0xd5 0xd6 0xd7. o Message ID shall be 9.
The Notify Payload: 000 00 00 00 0c 00 00 40 01 00 00 00 0a ......@.....
Plaintext (with no padding and a zero pad length): 000 00 00 00 0c 00 00 40 01 00 00 00 0a 00 ......@...... In this case, the length of the AAD is an integral multiple of 16, so when constructing the input to Poly1305 there was no need for padding. The ciphertext is 13 octets long, so it is followed by three zero octets. The input to Poly1305 is 32 octets of AAD, 13 octets of ciphertext, 3 octets of zero padding, and two 8-octet length fields in little-endian byte order. 
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